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In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion. A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a ''Condorcet loser'' to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate. (Not all elections will have a Condorcet loser since it is possible for three or more candidates to be mutually defeatable in different head-to-head competitions.) A slightly weaker (easier to pass) version is the majority Condorcet loser criterion, which requires that a candidate who can be defeated ''by a majority'' in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate, lose. It is possible for a system, such as Majority Judgment, which allows voters not to state a preference between two candidates, to pass the MCLC but not the CLC. Compliant methods include: two-round system, instant-runoff voting (AV), contingent vote, borda count, Schulze method, ranked pairs, and Kemeny-Young method. Noncompliant methods include: plurality voting, supplementary voting, Sri Lankan contingent voting, approval voting, range voting, Bucklin voting and minimax Condorcet. == Examples == 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Condorcet loser criterion」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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